Abstract: The miraculous nature of the Qurʾan is one of the most important topics discussed in the Sciences of the Qurʾan (ʿulūm al-Qurʾān). There are two basic views regarding the inimitability of the Qurʾan and the source of its miraculous nature. Most scholars are of the opinion that this inimitability stems from an essential quality within the Qurʾan, for example, its eloquence, the loftiness of its meanings, etc. However, a small fraction of Qurʾanic researchers say that this stems from something outside the Qurʾan itself, i.e., the power and choice of God. The latter state that if the Qurʾan were essentially inimitable, then: (1) all of the Qurʾan would not be a miracle; (2) it would be easier to distinguish the difference between the Qurʾan and an ordinary eloquent sentence, than the difference between an ordinary eloquent sentence and an ordinary uneloquent sentence; (3) the Companions would not mistake texts that did not belong to the Qurʾan with the Qurʾanic text, and they would not doubt whether something was a part of the Qurʾan; (4) and either the Qurʾan would not quote human beings from the past, or these quotes would not be parts of the Qurʾan. Conversely, those who say that the Qurʾan is essentially inimitable say that if the inimitability of the Qurʾan stemmed from something outside it, then: 1) the inimitability of the Qurʾan would not have to last forever for it to be a miracle; 2) its opponents would not be amazed at the nature of the Qurʾan itself, rather, by their inability to imitate it; and 3) that works similar to the Qurʾan would have existed before it. Upon careful consideration of the proofs of both sides of this debate, we see that those of the adherents of the essential inimitability of the Qurʾan are somewhat stronger. Thus, it is a more acceptable view regarding the miraculous nature of the Qurʾan and its inimitability.

Key Words: Qurʾan, inimitability, essential inimitability, accidental inimitability, miracle, eloquence. 


Introduction

Discussions surrounding the miraculous nature of the Qurʾan and its inimitability have intrigued Islamic scholars for many centuries. This intrigue stemmed from the various theological issues that undergird these debates. There is a difference of opinion amongst Qurʾanic researchers regarding why the Qurʾan is inimitable. Generally speaking, there are two main views in this regard. Most scholars are of the opinion that there is something essential to the Qurʾan that does not allow it to be reproduced by man. Its eloquence, the loftiness of its meanings, and its predictions of future events are qualities that human beings are incapable of incorporating in their own works. However, there are a small number of scholars who say that the Qurʾan is not inherently inimitable through a theory called ṣarfah. Rather, human beings can also produce something similar to the Qurʾan. If they do not, then this is because God prevents them from doing so. Thus, the inimitability of the Qurʾan stems from something outside it, i.e., the will and power of God.

The scholars of the second group, those who believe in ṣarfah, differ amongst themselves regarding how God prevents humans from imitating the Qurʾan. Some say that He does not give them the motive to do so. Others say that while humans have the motive to imitate the Qurʾan, God does not allow them to make the intention to do so. Finally, a group of scholars say that God removes from people the knowledge of how to imitate the Qurʾan when they make the intention to do so. Some say that this removal of knowledge may occur before the Qurʾan is revealed, while others say that it only occurs afterwards.

There is also a difference of opinion regarding why certain scholars believe in ṣarfah. However, the stronger view is that this theory stems from the arguments for ṣarfah that will be discussed hereunder. In the forthcoming, we will discuss some of the arguments for the legitimacy of ṣarfah and answer them. Thereafter, we will look at the arguments that the proponents of the essential inimitability of the Qurʾan have presented. We hope to show that the inimitability of the Qurʾan is essential to it because its arguments are the soundest.

Arguments for Ṣarfah

Rational Arguments:

1st Argument: If the Qurʾan were Essentially Miraculous, then Its Entirety could not be a Miracle.

If the Qurʾan were essentially miraculous, then all of the Qurʾan could not be a miracle.

However, the entire Qurʾan is a miracle.

Therefore, the Qurʾan is not essentially miraculous.[1]Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Ṭabāṭābāʾī, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾā n, vol. 1 (Qum: Ismāʿīliyyān, 2013), p. 69.

We can prove the truth of the first premise of this argument in the following manner:

If the Qurʾan, in its entirety, were essentially miraculous, then it could not express one matter with different sentence structures.

However, it does express one matter with different sentence structures.

So, if the Qurʾan were essentially miraculous, then all of the Qurʾan could not be a miracle.

We can prove the truth of the first premise of this argument in the following manner: The underlying idea behind this premise is that if we say there is a hierarchy to sentence structures, then the one that falls outside of the power of man would only be the highest of these. The lower levels would be the ones that other beings could produce. This is because there is a similitude between an agent and its effect.

If there were a specific type of sentence structure man is essentially incapable of producing, then the various sentence structures that could convey a single meaning would be subject to gradation. This implies that the highest of these sentence structures would be the one that could not be produced by man. And those that can be produced by him would fall on a lower scale of the hierarchy of these sentence structures. If this were true, those lower grades would not be miraculous, and therefore, the entire Qurʾan would not be miraculous. This is because the Qurʾan expresses similar meanings using different sentence structures, some of which—based upon the abovementioned line of reasoning—cannot be inimitable and miraculous. However, the entire Qurʾan is miraculous.

This argument for ṣarfah is clearly invalid. It is true that if certain forms of speech were miraculous and others were not, then there would be a hierarchy to forms of speech. However, we cannot say that the essentially miraculous form of speech could only be the one situated at the highest degree in this hierarchy. It is also equally possible for there to be a number of forms of speech that are lower than the singularly highest possibility, but which are still essentially inimitable and miraculous.

Secondly, the primary reason used to substantiate this argument—that there is a necessary similitude between the agent and its effect—is not only false, but incapable of being applied to the case at hand. This proposition apparently stems from the philosophical principle that an effect must be similar to its cause. Thus, if the cause of the inimitability of the Qurʾan were the eloquence that God placed in it, then that eloquence would have to be infinitely great, just like its cause, which is God. In conclusion, anything lower than the highest levels of eloquence could not be a part of the Qurʾan—since it would not stem from God—and would be imitable. However, this philosophical principle has long been proven invalid—as noted by many great Islamic philosophers.[2]Mullā Ṣadrā is of the opinion that the simpler a reality is, the more meanings it will contain in itself. “A simple reality is all things.” The more meanings it contains, the more effects it will be able to produce. Based on this reasoning, this sage disagreed with the Peripatetic philosophers who said that since the human soul is a simple being, it can only have one type of effect, i.e., intellection, and that the rest of the effects that we see within the human being must be carried out by faculties that serve as tools for the human being. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, “The soul in its unity is all of its faculties and their effects are contained within its effect.” The same can be said of God, who is the simplest of all beings.

Thirdly, even if this principle were true, it could only be applied to the first effect of God, i.e., the being that is immediately produced by Him. It could not be applied to those beings that are created by God through a medium, as is the case with the Qurʾan. According to Qurʾanic scholars, the Qurʾan’s verses were revealed in various ways to the Prophet (ṣ). Only certain verses were revealed to him (ṣ) directly. The others were revealed through the medium of an angel or even several angels.

Finally, this argument relies upon a false assumption, i.e., that the Qurʾan repeats the same ideas in different words. According to most experts in the field of Qurʾanic studies, there is no real repetition in the Qurʾan. Meaning, although basic Qurʾanic ideas may be repeated, specific meanings are not.

2nd Argument: If the Qurʾan Were Essentially a Miracle, It Would Be Easier to Distinguish the Difference between the Qurʾan and a non-Qurʾanic Eloquent Sentence, than the Difference between a non-Qurʾanic Eloquent Sentence and an Uneloquent Sentence.

If the Qurʾan were essentially a miracle, then it would be easier to distinguish the difference between the Qurʾan and an ordinary eloquent sentence, than the difference between an ordinary eloquent sentence and an ordinary uneloquent sentence. This is because the disparity between the former two would be more than the difference between the latter two.

However, this is not true. In other words, distinguishing between the Qurʾan and a non-Qurʾanic eloquent sentence is not easier than distinguishing between a non-Qurʾanic eloquent sentence and an uneloquent sentence.

Therefore, the Qurʾan is not essentially a miracle.[3]Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūṣī, Tamhīd al-Uṣūl (Qum: Rāʾid, 1394), p. 483-4.

This argument can be refuted in a number of ways. First of all, it seems that the proponent of this argument assumes that if the Qurʾan were essentially a miracle, then it would be easier for all human beings to distinguish the difference between the Qurʾan and an ordinary eloquent sentence, than the difference between an ordinary eloquent sentence and an ordinary uneloquent sentence. If true, then we cannot agree with the first premise of this argument. This is because there is no necessary connection between the antecedent and the consequent here. In other words, while it is true that the consequent is false, and not everyone can distinguish the difference between the Qurʾan and an ordinary eloquent statement easier than between an uneloquent statement and an ordinary eloquent one (in other words, the second premise is true), there is no connection between this and the Qurʾan’s being essentially miraculous. This is akin to saying that if the works of Shakespeare were really much better than that of a high-school English teacher, then everyone could distinguish between these two easier than they could distinguish between the works of the aforementioned English teacher and that of their pupil. This is clearly a false statement. Rather, the person for whom it is easier to understand the difference in question is the one who is an expert in the field in which the work of arts are produced. If this is what the proponent of this argument is trying to state (that is, if the Qurʾan were essentially a miracle, then it would be easier for an expert of Arabic literature to discern between the Qurʾan and a non-Qurʾanic eloquent sentence, than between that non-Qurʾanic eloquent sentence and an uneloquent sentence), then the first premise of the argument is valid. Nevertheless, the second premise is false. This is because history tells us that the pagan Arabs clearly discerned the difference between the Qurʾan and their eloquent poems much more easily than the difference between the latter and ordinary speech.

3rd Argument: If the Qurʾan Were Essentially Miraculous, then the Companions Would not Make Mistakes in Distinguishing It.

If the Qurʾan were essentially a miracle, the Companions would not mistake texts that did not belong to the Qurʾan with the Qurʾan, and they would not doubt whether something was a part of the Qurʾan.

However, the Companions of the Prophet (ṣ) did in fact confuse the Qurʾan with texts that were not part of the Qurʾan, and they sometimes rejected an actual part of the Qurʾan. The proof for this is that Ibn Masʿūd was not sure whether surahs 113 and 114 were actually a part of the Qurʾan or not.

Therefore, the Qurʾan is not essentially a miracle.[4]Muḥammad Hādī Maʿrifat, al-Tamhīd fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān, vol. 4 (Qum: Jāmiʿ al-Mudarrisīn, 1394), p. 171.

The answer to this argument is similar to that of the previous one. The proponent of this argument is under the assumption that in order for the Qurʾan to be essentially inimitable, it has to be infinitely greater than the most eloquent of human speech. In this case, it would be easily recognizable and distinguishable. However, we showed why this assumption is incorrect in the answer to the previous argument.

4th Argument: There Is no Reason to Believe that the Qurʾan is Inimitable.

If it were impossible for human beings to produce the likes of the Qurʾan, this would mean either: (1) they could not utter the words that it is composed of; or (2) they could not combine those words, one after the other; or (3) they could not have knowledge of how to combine them in such a manner that produced a miraculous text.

However, all of the abovementioned options are incorrect.

So, the Qurʾan is not essentially miraculous.

The impossibility of all the options mentioned in the consequent of the second premise of the argument is self-evident. Otherwise, if it were impossible for us to utter the words the Qurʾan is composed of, or if we could not combine them, then we would be unable to read the Qurʾan. This is because we have to pronounce these words, and combine them together in order to read them. However, we do read the Qurʾan. Therefore, both of these options are wrong.

Also, we cannot say that it is impossible for us to have knowledge of what combination of words produces a miraculous text, since this would necessitate that we would be unable to grasp the miraculous nature of the Qurʾan. However, we do grasp this. Therefore, this option is also incorrect. And, if all of these options are incorrect, then the Qurʾan is not essentially miraculous.

This argument is clearly invalid. Our point of contention is whether a human being can invent something like the Qurʾan, not whether or not he can unconditionally produce it. While it is true that in order to be able to invent something, you have to be able to produce it, the converse of this statement is not true. If someone could not copy the Mona Lisa, he certainly would not be able to invent it. However, it is not true to say that if someone was able to copy it, then he could also invent it.

5th Argument: If the Qurʾan Were Essentially Miraculous, It Would not Quote Others.

If the Qurʾan were essentially miraculous, then it would either not quote human beings from the past, or, if it did, these quotes would not be parts of the Qurʾan.

However, the Qurʾan does quote human beings from the past, and these quotes are definitely a part of the Qurʾan.

Therefore, the Qurʾan is not essentially miraculous.[5]Kamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Zamalkānī, al-Burhān al-Kāshif ʿan Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān (Baghdad: Maṭbaʿat al-Ānī, 1396 A.H.), p. 53.

This argument can be answered in two ways. First, it is based on the idea that the Qurʾan quotes these individuals verbatim. This is debatable, as most of the people that it quotes were not Arabic speakers. Secondly, even if we assume that the Qurʾan directly quotes human beings, this would not invalidate the essential inimitability of the Qurʾan. This is because the Qurʾan does not appear to challenge human beings to imitate a single verse of the Qurʾan; rather, the Qurʾan only challenges human beings to imitate the entire Qurʾan, ten chapters from the Qurʾan, or even a single full chapter. In essence, the fallacy in this argument lies in that its proponent assumes that the Qurʾan challenges human beings to imitate individual verses.

6th Argument: If the Qurʾan Were Essentially Inimitable, then Words Would not Indicate Their Meanings through Coining.

If human beings could not imitate the Qurʾan, it would mean that they could not indicate certain meanings (i.e., the meanings of the Qurʾan) by means of certain words (i.e., the words of the Qurʾan). If true, it would mean that the quality of the indication in this instance would by its very nature not be man-made.

However, this is not the case, since words indicate meanings because man coins words to indicate them. He does this because in his social interactions, he needs words to indicate meanings.

Thus, it is wrong to say that human beings cannot imitate the Qurʾan.[6]Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Ṭabāṭābāʾī, al-Mizān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’an, vol. 1 (Qum: Ismāʾīlīān, 2013), p. 69.

This argument can be answered in the following manner: We agree with the fact that coining, that is, the attribute of indication[7]Also called, “signification.” that individual words have—stems from humans. However, this does not imply that only humans coin the combination of words—in the form of sentences and paragraphs—to indicate meanings. If the latter is what the proponent of this argument is claiming, then the falsity of the consequent can be called into question, even though there may be a necessary connection between the antecedent and the consequent of the first premise. However, if the former is what he is claiming—i.e., that humans coin individual words to refer to certain meanings—then there is no necessary connection between the antecedent and the consequent, even though the antecedent may in fact be false.

7th Argument: The Qurʾan Is Subject to Being Abrogated.

The Qurʾan is subject to being abrogated.

That which is essentially miraculous is not subject to being abrogated.

Thus, the Qurʾan is not essentially miraculous.

We can prove the second premise of this argument in the following manner:

That which is essentially inimitable is not capable of being imitated by anyone, even God. Otherwise, it would not be essentially inimitable. This is because if it were capable of being imitated—even by God—then when it was imitated, its essential quality would cease to exist. In this case, it would not be essential to it. This goes against the assumption.

That which is incapable of being imitated—even by God—is incapable of being abrogated—even by God.

Thus, that which is essentially miraculous is not capable of being abrogated—even by God.

This argument is clearly invalid. The fallacy in the argument stems from the word “essential” used in the phrase “essential inimitability.” Apparently, the person making the argument assumes that this essential inimitability is absolute and related to all beings, even God. No one ever made such a claim. “Essential inimitability” implies that the Qurʾan is not capable of being imitated by man due to a quality, which is essentially inherent within it, not because of some extraneous factor. Thus, this argument also rests on fallacious grounds.

Religious Arguments

1st Argument:

­­­­­­In the 31st verse of Sūrat al-Anfāl, God relates the following from the disbelievers: “If we wished, we could have said something similar to it (i.e., the Qurʾan). It is nothing but the stories of the ancients.”

Although God does not explicitly state here that the disbelievers are lying, the 30th to 32nd verses of this chapter relate certain false claims of the disbelievers. This is a clue that this claim is also probably false. This probability renders this argument indecisive.

2nd Argument:

In the 146th verse of Sūrat al-Aʿrāf, God states: “I will turn away from My signs those who are unjustly proud in the Earth; and if they see every sign, they will not believe in it; and if they see the way of rectitude, they do not take it for a way; and if they see the way of error, they take it for a way; this is because they rejected Our communications, and were heedless of them.”

Apparently, this verse has nothing to do with the topic at hand. This is because the word āyāt (signs) is a reference to the cosmological signs of God’s power that exist in the external world, not the verses of the Qurʾan.

What is more, it states that the pride of these individuals prevents them from believing in God, even though they witness the signs of God’s power in the horizons.

Arguments Against Ṣarfah

1st Argument: The Opponents of the Qurʾan Were Amazed at the Eloquence of the Qurʾan.

If the Qurʾan were not essentially a miracle, rather, God prevented its opponents from imitating it, then these opponents would not be amazed at the nature of the Qurʾan itself, rather, by their inability to imitate it.

However, history tells us that they were actually amazed at the Qurʾan itself.

The Qurʾan is essentially miraculous and inimitable.[8]Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Nihāyat al-Ījāz fī Dirāyat al-Iʿjāz (Qum: Rāʾid, 1394), p. 26-27.

2nd Argument: The Inimitability of the Qurʾan is Eternal.

If the Qurʾan were not essentially a miracle, rather, God prevented its opponents from imitating it, then the inimitability of the Qurʾan would not have to last forever for it to be a miracle. In other words, if God prevented the opponents of the Qurʾan from imitating it once, even though they had the power to do so, then it would be enough to convince them that it came from God.

However, the inimitability of the Qurʾan is eternal and must last forever. Apparently, the truth of this premise rests upon certain verses of the Qurʾan that indicate human beings will never be able to produce the likes of the Qurʾan.

The Qurʾan is essentially a miracle and inimitable.[9]ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, al-Risālah al-Shāfiyah (Qum: Maktabat Ayat-Llah al-Marʿashīal-Najafī, 1396), p. 146-148.

It seems that this argument is somewhat problematic. Apparently, the only thing that can be gathered from the verses of the Qurʾan is that the Qurʾan will never be reproduced by humans. It does not say that it cannot be reproduced by humans. This is while the consequent of the first premise allows for it to be reproduced later on without contradicting its miraculous nature. Thus, the matter that has actually been affirmed in the consequent has not been negated in the second premise. This objection seems warranted enough, unless someone could prove that the emphasis that the Qurʾan places on this matter proves that it will not occur and, what is more, that it is also impossible.

3rdArgument: The Qurʾan was not Preceded by Anything like It.

If the Qurʾan were not essentially a miracle, rather, God prevented its opponents from imitating it, then something like the Qurʾan would have existed before its revelation, or its opponents would not have been able to distinguish whether the Qurʾan is essentially miraculous, or whether God was preventing them from imitating it.

However, nothing similar to the Qurʾan existed before its revelation, and the opponents of the Qurʾan were able to distinguish where its inimitability lied. The proof for the verity of this premise lies in the fact that if works actually existed that resembled the Qurʾan and that predated its revelation, then the opponents of the Qurʾan would have mentioned it when they were challenged to imitate it. That they did not shows that nothing like the Qurʾan existed before it.

Thus, the Qurʾan is essentially miraculous.[10]Muḥammad al-Ṭayyibal-Bāqilānī, Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān (Qum:Maktabat Āyatullah al-Marʿashī an-Najafī, 1398), p. 30.

4th Argument: If the Inimitability of the Qurʾan Stemmed from Something Outside It, then It Should Have Used the Least Eloquent of Words.

If the inimitability of the Qurʾan stemmed from the fact that God prevented its opponents from imitating it—even though they essentially had the power to do so—then it would have been better for God to have used the least eloquent of words in the Qurʾan. This is because its opponents would have felt the power of God and their own inability to oppose it in a more tangible manner. In this way, the miraculous nature of the Qurʾan would have been better felt by them.

However, the Qurʾan does not use the least eloquent of words.

The inimitability of the Qurʾan does not stem from the fact that God prevents its opponents from imitating it.[11]Ibid.

Conclusion

Now that we have seen the arguments for and against the theory of the accidental inimitability of the Qurʾan, we can conclude that this theory is logically unsound and religiously unacceptable. Therefore, the only rationally and religiously acceptable theory is to say that the Qurʾan is essentially inimitable and miraculous.

And all praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the worlds.

Sayyid Shiraz Husain Agha teaches the rational sciences in the seminary of Qum, Iran.

Notes   [ + ]

1. Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Ṭabāṭābāʾī, al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾā n, vol. 1 (Qum: Ismāʿīliyyān, 2013), p. 69.
2. Mullā Ṣadrā is of the opinion that the simpler a reality is, the more meanings it will contain in itself. “A simple reality is all things.” The more meanings it contains, the more effects it will be able to produce. Based on this reasoning, this sage disagreed with the Peripatetic philosophers who said that since the human soul is a simple being, it can only have one type of effect, i.e., intellection, and that the rest of the effects that we see within the human being must be carried out by faculties that serve as tools for the human being. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, “The soul in its unity is all of its faculties and their effects are contained within its effect.” The same can be said of God, who is the simplest of all beings.
3. Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūṣī, Tamhīd al-Uṣūl (Qum: Rāʾid, 1394), p. 483-4.
4. Muḥammad Hādī Maʿrifat, al-Tamhīd fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān, vol. 4 (Qum: Jāmiʿ al-Mudarrisīn, 1394), p. 171.
5. Kamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Zamalkānī, al-Burhān al-Kāshif ʿan Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān (Baghdad: Maṭbaʿat al-Ānī, 1396 A.H.), p. 53.
6. Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Ṭabāṭābāʾī, al-Mizān fī Tafsīr al-Qur’an, vol. 1 (Qum: Ismāʾīlīān, 2013), p. 69.
7. Also called, “signification.”
8. Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Nihāyat al-Ījāz fī Dirāyat al-Iʿjāz (Qum: Rāʾid, 1394), p. 26-27.
9. ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, al-Risālah al-Shāfiyah (Qum: Maktabat Ayat-Llah al-Marʿashīal-Najafī, 1396), p. 146-148.
10. Muḥammad al-Ṭayyibal-Bāqilānī, Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān (Qum:Maktabat Āyatullah al-Marʿashī an-Najafī, 1398), p. 30.
11. Ibid.